

May 19, 1971

S 7313

with the letter and intent of the Voting Rights Act, and

Whereas, recent judicial decisions have raised the possibility of certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 being applied so as to nullify past annexations;

Now, therefore, be it resolved that the Municipal Association of South Carolina in 31st annual convention assembled pledge its support to a bill to be introduced into the United States House of Representatives by Congressman Floyd Soence, which would amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965 so as to provide that failure on the part of the State of South Carolina or any political subdivision thereof to comply with any provision of this section shall not have the effect of interfering with, nullifying, terminating, or rendering without force and effect any annexation, on or before January 14, 1971, in connection with any municipality in such State;

Be it further resolved that copies of this resolution be forwarded to each member of the South Carolina delegation.

Holabird
**ERVIN HEARINGS ON PRIVACY, III—
TESTIMONY OF JOHN M. O'BRIEN,
EDWARD D. SOHIER, AND LAURENCE F. LANE**

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, today I would like to place in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the prepared statements of three former Army intelligence agents who testified this past February at the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee's hearings into the Government's data collection activities.

On December 16, 1970, I announced here on the Senate floor that I had received information which, if true, indicated the Army has been extensively engaged in the surveillance of civilian political activities. My information at that time was in the form of a letter which I read to the Senate that day. Today, I would like to place in the RECORD the statement prepared for our hearings by the author of that letter, former military intelligence agent John M. O'Brien.

In addition to Mr. O'Brien's testimony I think the statements of Mr. Edward D. Sohier and Mr. Laurence F. Lane should be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for all Americans to read. Mr. Sohier spent 15 months on duty with the counterintelligence analysis division. During this time he served as the only enlisted man on a task force created by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence—OASCI—to handle congressional inquiries into the Army's civil disturbance program.

Mr. Lane was an infantryman but was detailed to the Intelligence and Security Section of the 5th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colo., from December 1968 to June 1970. His testimony gives us an insight into the intelligence activities of the Continental Army Command—CONARC.

Mr. President, the statements of these three men plus the statements of Christopher H. Pyle and Ralph M. Stein which I introduced earlier together give us a clear picture of how widespread the Army's involvement in surveillance programs actually was. I ask unanimous consent that the statements of Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Sohier and Mr. Lane be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**STATEMENT OF JOHN M. O'BRIEN BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
FEBRUARY 24, 1971**

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee today. My name is John O'Brien and I served in the United States Army for almost five years. My last four years on active duty were spent as an Army Intelligence Agent, the first three in Western Germany, where I was trained as and performed the duties of an Army Intelligence Case Officer. During these three years I worked in the defensive counterespionage field and most of my work was directed against non-Americans, whose activities were thought to be inimical to the national defense interests of the United States. My last year on active duty with the United States Army was spent assigned to Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, in Evanston, Illinois. At Region I, I performed the duties of an Army Intelligence Case Officer. My duties at Region I were similar in nature to my duties while assigned to Western Europe, except that at Region I my activities were directed almost exclusively against United States citizens. I was honorably discharged from the United States Army on June 8, 1970, with the rank of staff Sergeant.

From June 1969 until approximately December 1969, I was assigned to the Special Operations Section of Region I. During that period, I worked primarily in undercover operations. These undercover operations included the recruitment, training and controlling of undercover agents utilized by the United States Army. On several occasions, I personally performed as an undercover agent as part of my assigned military duties. Special Operations activities at Region I consisted of the screening, investigation, recruitment, training, targeting, and controlling of individuals performing in an undercover capacity for the United States Army. Such activities were primarily directed against civilian organizations and individuals. Special Operations undercover activities were controlled from Fort Holabird. Prior to the initiation of an undercover operation, an operations plan for the implementation of the operation was written at either the Region or Group level and forwarded to Fort Holabird for approval. Once approval was authorized by Fort Holabird, all aspects of the operation were reported to Fort Holabird.

I also assisted the CONUS/Liaison Section at Region I. The CONUS/Liaison Section compiled personalia information concerning and monitored organizations and individuals engaged in activities to oppose the United States military involvement in Vietnam and in other activities and associations thought to be inimical to the national defense interests of the United States. Individuals included within the sphere of interest of CONUS included Adlai Stevenson III, Abner Mikva, the individual plaintiffs in the trial in Chicago, and many others including, newsmen, university professors, public officials and businessmen. At one period in late 1969, CONUS maintained dossiers concerning approximately 800 civilian organizations and individuals. These dossiers were commonly called the subversives files. The policy throughout Region I was to obtain any information available concerning organizations and individuals whose names were in a CONUS dossier. The dossiers contained, among other things, official military intelligence reports concerning the activities of the target organization or individual, copies of reports from other federal and non-federal investigative agencies, and copies of photographs taken by either military intelligence agents

posing as members of the news media or as free-lance photographers or by members of the other investigative agencies. The CONUS dossiers at Region I filled approximately nine filing cabinets with four or five drawers per cabinet. All the dossiers were stamped confidential.

The CONUS/Liaison activities in which I participated included the monitoring of civilian organizations which was carried out by military intelligence personnel who utilized radio cars, portable walkie-talkie equipment, photographic equipment, participation in demonstrations, and the like. Penetration was carried out by participation (without disclosure) in public demonstrations and activities.

In approximately January, 1970, my duties were changed. I was then assigned to the Special Investigations Branch of Region I. However, I continued at the request of the Region I Special Operations officer to participate in certain Special Operations activities and in assistance to CONUS/Liaison until approximately late May or early June, 1970.

My new duties with the Special Investigations Branch included personnel background investigations of individuals under consideration for security clearance, participation in sabotage and espionage investigations, and the conduct of liaison with local investigative agencies within the area of the Evanston field office of Region I.

After my discharge from the United States Army I visited Region I approximately twice monthly until the first week of December, 1970. During these visits I learned from conversations with personnel assigned both to Special Operations and CONUS that the collection of information concerning the activities of civilians was still taking place, and that Special Operations continued to conduct undercover operations directed against civilian organizations.

My concern as to the legitimacy and necessity of my activities while assigned to Region I began in September 1969, when I witnessed the initiation of a file concerning Adlai Stevenson III. I concluded that such activities posed a threat to every American's right to freedom of expression and to the system of government under which we have lived in the United States since the inception of the United States Constitution. It is out of concern for those rights guaranteed to every American citizen that I sought on December 7, 1970, by a letter to Senator Ervin, to appear before you today, and I thank you again for the opportunity to have done so.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD D. SOHIER

In August 1970 I was separated from the Army, honorably, with the Army Commendation Medal and the rank of Specialist 5, E-5. I had spent nearly three years on active duty, 15 months of which on duty with the Counterintelligence Analysis Division (CIAD), Directorate of Counterintelligence, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI). I had entered the Army in October 1967, taken basic training at Fort Bragg, N.C., and was trained as a military stenographer at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. In May 1968, I joined the 902d Military Intelligence Group, which then had administrative control of CIAD. In January 1970, when the 902d MI Group became part of the U.S. Army Intelligence Command, CIAD remained under the control of OACSI.

My first encounter with the so-called CONUS intelligence program was in my first job at CIAD. That was assisting in the preparation of the two-volume publication, *Personalities, Organizations, and Cities of Interest*, called by CIAD, the Compendium. This book, which was to be updated five times in the period I was with CIAD, was a compilation of information on individuals and organizations in this country which

were regarded as potentially involved in domestic disturbances, in particular, in connection with anti-war and civil rights activities. Included in the lists were organizations such as Women's Strike for Peace, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, American Civil Liberties Union, Quaker Action Committee, National Mobilization Committee (to End the War in Vietnam), American Friends Service Committee, and many other such peace and civil rights groups, as well as more radical groups such as Students for a Democratic Society, Black Panther Party, and Weathermen. Individuals listed included the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Dr. Benjamin Spock, Dr. Ralph Abernathy, H. Rap Brown, and Eldridge Cleaver.

The Compendium was very widely distributed by OACSI. It was sent to elements of the armed forces in the continental U.S. (CONUS) and worldwide. It was sent to other branches of the government including the Justice Department (Federal Bureau of Investigation), Treasury Department (Secret Service), and State Department. It was augmented five times with changes (additions and deletions of pages of information), and, when the order was given to destroy all copies of the Compendium in the summer of 1970, a sixth change was in the works. The Compendium was classified SECRET.

CIAD also provided the armed forces and branches of the government with other publications regarding this area of interest. One was what was called an estimate, which provided an analysis of past events in the nation and an estimate of the potential for domestic disorders for the upcoming period. I believe this publication was prepared annually. Its purpose was to inform the Army commands of the potential need for Army support required to keep the order in the nation in case of disorders.

OACSI, and in particular, CIAD, was tasked with the responsibility of providing the Army with information regarding potentially disrupting situations in the United States. Since the Army has the responsibility of responding to a national call for aid in restoring order, it needs an agency to keep it informed of the potential for that call for aid, and thus, the potential for civil disturbances. In doing so OACSI kept a sharp eye and ear on potential "trouble-makers" both individuals and organizations, and their activities.

Much of the information was gathered by CIAD from the press. Most of the rest of the information was supplied by direct liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and, to a lesser extent, some other government investigative-type agencies. By far the largest supplier of information reports was the FBI, from whom CIAD almost daily received foot-high stacks of information reports. Naturally, the FBI was a recipient of CIAD report, too, but CIAD received much more than it supplied. Another channel of information to the CIAD analysts was through the U.S. Army Intelligence Command's teletype, which would supply as many as 100 "spot reports" daily. These reports were forwarded to the Command at Fort Holabird, Maryland, for teletype distribution to other "interested" Army Intelligence and investigative agencies. In almost all cases, the reports concerned meetings and minor incidents all over the country. Many of them were like the one which comes to mind, regarding simply a meeting of 200 people in a church in Philadelphia. The report would state that 200 people attended a meeting today in such-and-such church, and that there were no incidents. Almost all reports were read and discarded by CIAD analysts, and were generally regarded as worthless.

CIAD analysts working in the domestic field maintained voluminous files. They were

files of clippings from the press, FBI reports, and other information from other agencies, within and without the Army. A computerized index had been prepared for the files, though there were no computer at CIAD's office in Alexandria, Virginia. The computer experts at CIAD used card-punching and other facilities of OACSI in the Pentagon to prepare the index. Dossiers were frequently received by CIAD analysts from the U.S. Army Investigative Records Repository at Fort Holabird.

During the time I was at CIAD the domestic intelligence program grew immensely. When I joined the group, there were perhaps ten members of the domestic section. When I left there were about twice that number. In that period the computerized index was developed. During that period the number of publications in this field produced by CIAD grew, and the number of reports received by CIAD analysts probably tripled.

In January 1970, OACSI was shocked by the publication of an article in *Washington Monthly* magazine by former Army Captain Christopher H. Pyle. OACSI put together what it called a "Task Group" in one of its offices at the Pentagon to work on problems that stemmed from sudden disclosure of Army activities in this field. The Task Group originally numbered about eight persons, several of whom were from CIAD. I was one, the only enlisted member, and I joined them originally as a typist and administrative man. The Task Group, over the next few months, was responsible for formulating new Army policy to appease critics of the domestic intelligence program, and for replying to letters from Senators, Congressmen, and citizens. Although letters went out over the signatures of Major General McChristian, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and others, nearly all were produced by this small group, put together for just this purpose.

The first reaction by CIAD to the Pyle article was, in typical fashion, to sit down and write a paragraph-by-paragraph refutation of every charge that Mr. Pyle made, regardless whether charges were factual, founded in fact, or whatever. This went on for about two weeks, but there was no end result, for meanwhile, the Task Group had been formed in the Pentagon to assume this function. The Task Group answered Congressional inquiries and press inquiries on this area of interest, and proceeded from the start to deny any and all charges, factual or otherwise. Eventually, with more and more Senators and Congressmen interested and informed, the group found it necessary to begin admitting some of the charges, but the Task Group, assumedly under orders from above, never admitted any more than it absolutely had to. It even went so far as to provide the Army's own General Counsel with misinformation at one point, so bent on denial was this group. Time and time again replies that were prepared by the group to respond to Congressional and citizens' criticism admitted and denied charges at will, disregarding considerations concerning the truth of their statements.

This was, I believe, a natural reaction of members of what is referred to by its members as the "intelligence community." There is a definite feeling of privilege among members of this "community"—privilege in respect to access to information and immunity to probing questions not only from citizens but also from the Congress and other departments of the government. There is, within the Army, a general distrust of Congress anyway, for Congress, a body of civilians, holds the power of funds over the military; professional military men feel their job would be easier without civilian interference in military matters; this feeling is much magnified in the military intelligence community, where it is coupled with the feeling of privilege and immunity.

By the time of my separation from active

duty, several directives had been issued to try to solve problems that arose out of what the Task Group referred to as the "Pyle Case," because of its origins in Mr. Pyle's first article. First, the Compendium was ordered destroyed, and destruction certificates were directed to be forwarded to the Task Group. I was responsible for checking the list of Compendium recipients against the growing stack of destruction certificates, but it was generally understood that, because of a faulty system of accounting for that particular SECRET document, we were probably never to account for all the Compendia. In addition to this problem, many recipients of the Compendium had difficulty locating and accounting for the document in their own offices. It is likely that OACSI will never guarantee that all copies distributed have been destroyed. Also, because the directive only ordered the destruction of those two volumes, not the information contained therein, I found that at least one recipient Xeroxed its copy of the book in order to be able to destroy its one official copy noted in OACSI records, while retaining a copy for further use. I have little doubt that this was done more than once. In fact, it was known at the time that the originating office for the Compendium, CIAD, had, in fact, microfilmed its own copy of the book for the same reason as above.

Other directives were issued during the summer, which restricted the kinds of reports that could be sent over the Fort Holabird teletype, the kinds of activities agents in the field could be dispatched to cover, restrictions on the use of covert and "undercover" agents, and the kinds of files and filing techniques that could and could not be used for storing domestic intelligence information.

The restrictions on the use of covert agents were interesting, for, each time the Army was questioned on this subject, it immediately stated that it had express orders forbidding that type of activity. However, when the press finally was able to specify some incidents of this type of activity (for instance, 118th MI Group agents in Washington, D.C., posing as newsmen with a van marked "Midwest News," covering anti-war demonstrations), official Army replies stated simply that covert agent activities had been banned, except with the express permission of the Secretary of the Army.

Probably the most agile defensive moves were made by the Army concerning its computers. Replies to initial press and Congressional inquiries concerning Army computers were that there were none. Period. This, of course, was done with full knowledge that there were computers, but without knowledge of, or, it appears, curiosity about, the kinds of work they were doing in the Army. Again, after heated exchanges with members of Congress and the press, the Army spokesmen (again, Task Group) were forced to go out and do some investigating on their own. The results were as surprising to Army brass in the Pentagon as to civilians, and shortly thereafter, orders were issued that computerized files may no longer be maintained or initiated on domestic intelligence activities, without the express permission of the Chief of Staff. Again, however, there were few restrictions on the type of information that may be kept in the computerized file.

Despite assurances by Army spokesmen that improper activities have been halted and will not begin again, my personal feeling is that a careful and constant watch will have to be maintained on the Army and other branches of the government which continue to harass and intimidate citizens with irresponsibly and clumsily constructed files. One of the most amazing discoveries I made during this period was concerning the nature of many of the files, and the criteria used to select those individuals and organizations "of interest" to Army intelligence.

gence. There were, in fact, no guidelines issued by the Army concerning persons and organizations of interest. Each office and command of the Army which had files in this area was responsible for determining for itself who and what would be included. There were, prior to the "Pyle Case," no Pentagon-issued directives giving criteria to be used in limiting files. Consequently, the program grew unchecked. With the increase in the number of civil disturbances and demonstrations in the nation beginning about the time of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, the Army likewise felt it necessary to expand its files and information-gathering activities. With no overall supervision, the agents and analysts could, in effect, expand the program as much as, and in whatever direction, they wished.

Even after some guidelines had finally been laid down, it was questionable how long they would be adhered to. A career officer, a member of the Task Group when I left, and long an intelligence officer, told me that he did not think the restrictions in effect at that time would last long. He said that it is only natural for the domestic intelligence community to want to continue expanding the scope of its activities in order to ensure that it is carrying out its duties effectively.

In view of the blatant lying an unceasing string of mis-statements made by Army spokesmen to Congressmen, members of the press, and citizens during 1970, I find it difficult to believe that we can take the official Army assurances at face value. The intelligence establishment and program are too powerful and too special to be left to their own devices. This can be seen in the way they have conducted themselves, essentially without supervision, over the past several years. In my estimation, some kind of civilian intelligence review board is needed, to watch over all the intelligence agencies of the U.S. government, including those within and without the military. This could prevent the kind of incursions into the civilian sector by the military we have witnessed, and would serve to make more efficient the intelligence operations that are necessary by eliminating duplication of efforts. Indeed, this is an important area of consideration, for it is doubtful that the Army's domestic intelligence program held any information not already held by other organizations, such as the F.B.I., and State and local law enforcement agencies.

TESTIMONY OF LAURENCE F. LANE BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman. My name is Laurence F. Lane. I am currently employed on the legislative staff of Congressman Robert N. Glavin of Connecticut. Also, I am a full-time graduate student at the George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

I served in the United States Army on active duty from June, 1968, until June, 1970. I was trained as an 11B, light-weapons infantry soldier at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and assigned to the 5th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado in early November, 1968. Soon after my arrival at Fort Carson, December, 1968, I was successful in my efforts to be detailed to the G2 (Intelligence and Security) Section of the 5th Infantry Division. Although my records were retained by infantry units—first the 2nd Battalion of the 61st Infantry and then the 3rd Battalion of the 10th Infantry—and "on paper" I was a member of those infantry units, I lived in the 5th Military Intelligence Detachment's*

* The 5th Military Intelligence Detachment merged with the 241st Military Intelligence Detachment in May, 1969. After the 241st M.I. was deactivated in September 1969, the 5th M.I. was reactivated.

quarters, and I worked in various positions in the office of the G2, 5th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, for the duration of my service, i.e. December 1968–June 1970.

Being sort of a "special case," i.e. an infantry soldier in an intelligence unit, I performed a number of functions, all closely related to the civil disturbance mission which was levied upon the 5th Division. Under the agreement which brought me from an infantry unit to the headquarters element, I was an intelligence analyst. Besides analyzing incoming information, during the eighteen months that I worked for G2, I performed a host of related tasks including agent and undercover duties; coordinator of agent reports; author of special intelligence projects; liaison visits with the 113th Military Intelligence Group, Region IV, and law enforcement agencies; and advisor to G2's and other members of the Division's hierarchy. Although the highest rank I obtained in my tour of active duty was Sergeant, E-5, the length of tenure at Fort Carson with the G2 staff, the interest and knowledge I developed, and the flexibility of my "special" status allowed me a broad base to observe the intelligence structure of that command and its relationship with other commands.

I wish to share with this Committee what I observed and a few of my experiences. I have divided my presentation into four parts: First, I will attempt to explain, briefly, the historical perspective of my activities. To indict the military's intrusion into domestic civilian affairs without attempting to define a frame of reference would be an injustice. Second, I will review the intelligence gathering structure as viewed from a divisional headquarters. I am certain a few of my observations from the divisional level will conflict with information presented from Army area commands and nationwide commands. My third section, discussing the phases of duty I experienced may account for the discrepancy of information concerning the intelligence gathering structure, i.e. the structure and direction of activities were directly related to the personalities in command. Fourth, I present a chronology of my activities to illustrate the workings of military intelligence.

Before I proceed, I want to make it perfectly clear to the Committee members that I do not have any "grudges to bear," nor a "cross to burn" against the United States Army. My purpose in testifying before this august body is to help make sure that our Constitution is observed by all. I am deeply concerned that serious errors in judgment were made which led to encroachment on the liberties of many Americans. I have offered my limited information not only to this Committee, but also to the investigators for the Department of Defense in order to help discover the depth of the intrusion and the causes. Underscoring this principle, I have refrained from naming superior officers and fellow workers to avoid misinterpretation and charges of character assassination.

I am certain the testimony by officials of the Department of Defense will document the rise of urban and campus violence as the impetus that thrust the military into establishing an intelligence network monitoring the activities of civilian organizations and maintaining dossiers on private individuals. I will not labor that point; however, allow me to specifically address the nationwide trend to the perspective from Fort Carson, Colorado. October, 1968, was an unusual month for Fort Carson. The Commanding General of the 5th Infantry Division was relatively new to the fort, and his G2, a Lieutenant Colonel, had recently returned from overseas. Media news reports and transmitted messages from intelligence commands forecasted rising violence. Demonstrators were organizing to storm the gates of the fort, or so it was reported. The National

Students for a Democratic Society conducted a National Council meeting at the Boulder campus of the University of Colorado, and urged an offensive against the military. Demonstrations followed the National Council meeting on the campuses of Colorado College, Denver University, Colorado State University, and the University of Colorado. Confronted with these reports, officials at Fort Carson over-reacted. The development of an intelligence gathering network tailored to the needs of the 5th Infantry Division ensued. This intelligence system was designed to supply the headquarters with information pertinent to the protection of Fort Carson, the protection of servicemen within the surrounding communities—defined as the State of Colorado, and to supply adequate information to fulfill the civil disturbance mission of the 5th Infantry Division.

The intelligence function of the 5th Infantry Division was the responsibility of the G2 (Intelligence and Security) Office of the General's Staff. At the disposal of the G2 was a small office staff for operations and the 5th Military Intelligence Detachment. The 5th Military Intelligence Detachment, with an average strength of forty men, was divided into sections by skills. Two of these sections were directly utilized by the G2 in the intelligence gathering function—the Order of Battle Section was utilized to augment the G2 Operations staff in analyzing, disseminating and filing intelligence, and the Counter-Intelligence Section was utilized to gather raw intelligence.

Part of the recent investigation by the Department of Defense centered on the use of personnel of the 5th Military Intelligence Counter-Intelligence Section to obtain raw intelligence on civilians. Guidelines reportedly were established which prevented the use of tactical units from interfering with the areas of operations of non-tactical intelligence commands. The intelligence gathering mission in Colorado by the military reportedly was the responsibility of the Denver based Region IV Headquarters of the 113th Military Intelligence Group. Field offices of the 113th M.I. were maintained in Colorado Springs and Fort Collins, besides the Denver headquarters. Whether the 5th M.I. was in violation of standing orders or whether it was not is a mute point. The Counter-Intelligence Section actively engaged in off-post, civilian oriented intelligence collection. I will comment further on this point in a few minutes.

In addition to the information developed by counter-intelligence operations, intelligence was gathered through other military channels, media reports, liaison with law enforcement agencies, research, and personal observations. The 5th Infantry Division was linked to intelligence commands by teletype. Nationwide reports were transmitted as events occurred and summarized periodically. Classified reports were received through the facilities of the communications center. Weekly and monthly reports of civil disturbances and related intelligence were received from the Headquarters of the major Army areas. Liaison was maintained between the G2 and the offices of the 113th M.I., Region IV. The 5th Division was only a phone call away from Fort Holabird, and it utilized the services of Fort Holabird to obtain special reports, classified dossiers, and computer readouts as the need arose. I might point out, that often the special reports and dossiers were received by the G2 Section unsolicited.

A major source of information for the publications of G2 was the news media. Newspapers were received from over twenty cities. These papers were read, clipped, and classified. Television and radio news specials were often monitored as an important source. An informal liaison—sanctioned but not ordered—was maintained with the local law enforcement agencies to include the Colorado

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Springs Federal Bureau of Investigation Field Office, the Colorado Springs Police Department, and the El Paso County Sheriff's Office. The other two inputs in the intelligence process, research and personal observation, were related to the interests of the individuals performing the analysis.

The incoming information was processed in the G2 Operations Section reinforced by the members of the 5th Military Intelligence Order of Battle Section. The combined operation was divided by Army Areas, with a specific section devoted to special group analysis. This operation produced a civil disturbance summary which was circulated through the headquarters staffs, major commands of the Division, had disseminated to 5th Army Headquarters, 113th M.I. offices and other units with a civil disturbance mission. The summary was produced weekly, with variations of daily and tri-weekly publication depending upon the demands of the headquarters. Special reports, analyzing specific civilian organizations or reviewing the activities of individuals or studying events, were occasionally disseminated.

A complex filing system was established to store intelligence for future reference. Card cross-files were maintained on individuals, cities, and organizations. Each card indicated where source material was stored, i.e. spot reports, newspaper clippings, agent reports, etc. Clippings and teletype reports normally were categorized chronologically, whereas, agent reports, dossiers, and other developed information were filed by subject. The maintenance of the file systems became a major task. The disinterest of the clerks to labor at file maintenance led to a large backlog and eventually to the destruction of the cross-file system. I might interject, the cross-file system was developed by a Lieutenant and he persisted in his interest in maintaining it. Soon after his discharge, Fall 1969, the system was re-evaluated in light of the burdens of maintaining it, and it was eliminated. In place of the complex cross-file index, the new officer-in-charge instituted a work-book system where incoming intelligence was categorized by Army Areas in tabloid work-books.

The collecting, processing and dissemination of intelligence went through numerous phases during my eighteen months with G2. Changes in direction and interests were related to the civil disturbance mission of the 5th Infantry Division, but, they were even more directly related to the personnel in authority. Simply stated, the operations of the 5th Military Intelligence Detachment and the G2 Operations Section of the 5th Infantry Division were an extension of its leadership personnel and not a part of any pyramidal national military conspiracy.

Both commanders of the 5th Infantry Division and Fort Carson under whom I served were ambitious Generals with successful military careers. A civil disturbance mission was levied on the division and these men were responsible for accomplishing that mission. Their determination to be totally prepared placed a major burden on the G2 (Intelligence and Security) Section of the General's Staff. Faced with the responsibility to keep the commander informed, the intelligence system including linkage with the national intelligence system and the gathering of local raw intelligence developed.

I served under four G2's, each a Lieutenant Colonel filling his requirement for staff duty. The attitude of these men was fundamental in molding the intelligence operation of the G2 Operations section and the 5th M.I. I was brought to the G2 staff by a very driving, deeply concerned and dedicated Lieutenant Colonel. Recently returned from Vietnam, this gentleman was attempting to secure the greatest amount of intelligence that he could in order to be an effective advisor to the Division Commander. He worked his staff hard, but he worked harder. His

initiative prompted the build-up of an intelligence structure designed to analyze nationwide events and to monitor local activities. The second G2 inherited the informal structure developed under the first, and he attempted to institutionalize it. Versed in counter-intelligence operations in foreign countries, the second G2 showed displeasure with the diverse opinions which flourished under his predecessor and he immediately took steps to purge dissent within the staff and to limit the access to raw intelligence on a need to know basis. Mistrust was evident in relationships with other intelligence agencies and with law enforcement agencies.

Under the second G2, who served from March 1969 to September 1969, the intelligence gathering mechanism reached its zenith. Agents were placed in Colorado Springs for extended periods, agents followed agents from other military intelligence operations, and an agent was even placed undercover in the officers' housing area of the fort. The command of G2 changed in late September. The incoming G2 was probably best characterized by his own quote—"You don't seem to understand, Larry. I don't want to be G2!" During his tenure which extended to January 1970, intelligence operations were cutback. In January 1970, the G2 position again changed. The incoming G3 shared the concern of many of us on the staff that intelligence operations had violated basic civil liberties. Programs were consolidated with a direction on military affairs and the specific civil disturbance mission levied on the Division.

As much as the direction of the intelligence structure relied on the leadership of the G2, it also paralleled the initiative of junior officers who oversaw specific intelligence functions. For instance, I have already mentioned that the cross-file index system was maintained under order of the Lieutenant who instituted it. The work book system and the investigation of relaying incoming information into a computer system (which was never done, but seriously studied) were projects favored by the Captain who commanded the 5th Military Intelligence Detachment. The informal liaison with the offices of the 113th M.I. and law enforcement agencies was established and maintained by an experienced counterintelligence agent. The need-to-know limitations imposed under the second G2 and the cloak of mistrust surrounding agent activities were acceptable to the officer who commanded counter-intelligence during this period. At the same time, the scaling down of the intelligence operations under the third and fourth G2's was encouraged by the almost total turnover of junior officers in the G2 Operations Section but impeded and fought by the ambitious commander of the 5th M.I.

Thus far in this presentation, I have attempted to inform you of the analytical framework of intelligence operations in Colorado. However, if I share with you a chronology of my activities and a discussion of a few select operations, I believe that you will have a better understanding of the functional nature of the operation.

When I joined the G2 Operations staff in mid-December, 1968, two officers and two men had just started molding the intelligence machine which we affectionately called the "monster." The month before, a Brigade of troops had been placed on full alert to cope with a demonstration of several hundred outside of the gates to the Fort. Rumors of violence magnified by the rise of student, Chicano and Black groups laid heavy demands on the G2 to provide timely intelligence to the Commanding General. Prominent in the news was the trouble at the San Francisco State College. Two questions asked were, what is happening and will Federal troops be needed? Based on the intelligence reports transmitted across the teletype hook-up, 5th Army summaries, and newspaper ac-

counts, I wrote a paper analyzing the violence. Although the sources were rather inadequate, I attempted to be analytical and to develop a model of campus violence that could be applicable to other situations. My effort was appreciated, the G2 was pleased, and the Commanding General was convinced that we were on top of the situation.

Colorado College sponsored a "Symposium on Violence." The Symposium attracted many leading spokesmen for the New Left including Mike Klonsky, National Secretary, SDS; Jon Sunstrom, spokesman for the East Side New York Service Organization; Arnold Kaufman, a founder of the teach-in movement; John Sack, an outspoken critic of the war in Vietnam and author; Ivanhoe Donaldson, a founder of SNCC; Richard (Dick) Gregory, comedian and civil rights activist; Andrew Kopkind, staff writer for the "New Republic"; Richard Flacks, an early anti-war critic; Sidney Peck, co-chairman of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam; Joe Boyd, reportedly a member of the Denver Black Panther organization; and numerous other spokesmen on violence as a tactic. An elaborate intelligence operation was instituted to cover the event. Agents from the 113th MI field office in Colorado Springs and the headquarters in Denver covered the event for the purpose of feeding information to the intelligence command. The G2 at Fort Carson mobilized the few agents of the 5th Military Intelligence Detachment and of the then separate 241st Military Intelligence Detachment to monitor the activities of the Symposium in order that the Commanding General be forewarned of possible violence. Another analyst, a Harvard graduate who was a reservist called to active duty, and I, were asked to attend the symposium not as undercover agents, but as observers. Our mission was to interpret the week of lectures, panels, and performances within the perspective of national and state-wide trends.

Viewed as an intelligence operation, the symposium coverage was excellent. The information transmitted to Fort Holabird included daily summaries of activities and rumors of upcoming demonstrations. A volume of information was compiled to include agent reports, pictures and the two independent appraisals of the symposium. This report was forwarded up the intelligence chain of command and most likely made its way to Fort Holabird.

Two quick sidelights come to mind. Dossiers were ordered on the participants of the symposium from Fort Holabird. I forget which dossiers were received and which ones were not, however, one dossier which we did receive summarized the intelligence background material on civil rights leader Dick Gregory. The dossier was so tainted that it was unusable. I was amazed that the dossier from Fort Holabird was completely subjective, based on unsubstantiated information and unreliable sources with no attempt to be objective. Attempts were made to link individuals to communist organizations through a process of guilt by association, whether association was a fact or not. The pattern set by the summaries of information utilized for the Colorado College Symposium, i.e., unreliable and unusable information, continued throughout the period that I was with G2. Most of the information contained in the printed dossiers from Fort Holabird lacked any intelligence value.

Secondly, the Colorado College *Tiger* proudly displayed a picture of the agent from the 113th M.I. field office in Colorado Springs the week following the Symposium. In the subsequent editions, there were comments from the editorial staff of the paper and from students questioning the role of the military intelligence on campus. The debate culminated in an article written by someone from the Fort Carson headquarters documenting monitoring of campus events.

January was a month of rising publicity for the Students for a Democratic Society. The small chapter at Colorado College attracted a number of state and national SDS leaders. The G2 was concerned about the build-up. I was asked to research the Students for a Democratic Society and to write a study of the organization, nationwide and statewide. Several agents were assigned to monitor the activities of student activists at Colorado College. Their reports, which included summaries of SDS activities as well as other campus groups—including one report on a debate conducted at the school with the Young Republicans participating, were forwarded through the intelligence command with a copy normally being made available for my use. I was encouraged to attend functions at the school and to maintain friendships with student activists. Being an infantry soldier by assignment, I did not need to establish a false identity or justification for attending functions. A few servicemen normally attend campus functions. In fact, the presence of these servicemen has been cited as the reason for military intelligence surveillance. As for the counter-intelligence agents who attended these functions, some used a "cover" such as students from other campuses, free-lance photographer, or "hippie." Special attention was given to functions which attracted nationwide spokesmen for various causes, especially anti-war causes. Keeping track of the whereabouts of national SDS leaders and local radical students was extremely important. The emerging racial and Mexican-American movements, especially campus organizations of Blacks and Chicanos, received great attention. Anti-war elements in the community were viewed with great suspicion. During this period of increasing activism in Colorado, at least twice I was questioned by agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding individuals about whom they were concerned.

In late February, the first of my research projects was completed. I had compiled a sixty-nine page review of the National Students for a Democratic Society. Copies of the publication were sent through the intelligence command. Four months later, Fort Holabird published a similar document—duplicated in part—not only reviewing the background of the Students for a Democratic Society, but also listing known (unsubstantiated) members of SDS chapters throughout the nation. The Fort Holabird document was cross indexed by state and school.

Preparation and research for my second report, an in depth view of the Students for a Democratic Society as it related to Colorado included a week of "liaison" in Denver and a week of "liaison" in Fort Collins. Officially, I was sent on temporary duty to the 13th M.I. Group, Region IV headquarters and field office. However, my visitations not only included utilization of the files of these offices but also meetings with police and campus officials in Boulder, Denver, and Fort Collins, Colorado. Both weeks, with a rental car paid for at Army expense, I was encouraged to visit campuses and rekindle my friendship with activists. The result of my research was a book, approximately 115 pages in length, detailing the growth of the organization in the state, activists involved, allied organizations, and a chronology of protest meetings and demonstrations in the state from 1965 on. This publication was also forwarded through the intelligence command. It is my understanding that both of the publications were sanitized (de-classified by removal of any reference to the military or to the author) and made available to a Congressional Committee investigating campus violence.

A third paper was written summarizing the information developed in the two previous publications and attempting to analyze the movement. Several of the conclusions were

objectionable to the political views of the G2. I refused to accept the criticisms especially those which the evidence I gathered disproved. Many of my recommendations paralleled the conclusions of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. The third paper was never finalized.

As I mentioned earlier in this presentation, the second G2 for whom I worked was suspicious of dissent, and mistrustful of other intelligence-gathering activities. During his term of service as G2, the counter-intelligence section grew to over thirty men. The tactical responsibilities on the on-post counter intelligence operation were minimal while the section was extremely overstrength. The answer was to use these men to monitor the activities of activists in the community. Deep concern was expressed in particular in a family extremely active in the anti-war movement in Colorado Springs. Files were maintained on the family as well as a photograph book to make sure they were easily identified. Individuals who attended SDS meetings or Radical Education Programs meeting were of great interest. The small, but vocal anti-war faction within the community was viewed as a major threat.

It was about this time, that the jurisdictional battle between the 113th M.I. and the G2, 5th M.I. broke into the open. Two agents from the 5th M.I. Counter-intelligence Section attended the State SDS Convention, Colorado State College, Greeley, Colorado, in mid-April. The 113th M.I. commander had cautioned the G2 that having personnel there would be a violation of an informal agreement between the two intelligence units. The G2 sanctioned the mission of the two agents, and upon their return a report was filed by the G2 of the intelligence command listing the source as "two reliable sources, no further identification." The squabble developed into a game similar to two kids throwing mud at each other. The passing of information through liaison all but ceased. The G2 authorized the semi-permanent off-post activities of at least two agents. Their job became one of beating the 113th M.I. to the information and the monitoring of the activities of 113th M.I. personnel.

The classic illustration of the "spy versus spy" activities occurred at a demonstration in Colorado Springs—Fort Carson area, in mid-September 1969. Rumors of a huge demonstration bringing as many as 5,000-10,000 participants spurred the fort to an unusual state of preparedness. Elaborate preparations were made to monitor events. A newly installed Citizens' Band radio setup to include mobile car units and walking units was used. The demonstration, which had nationwide billing, attracted intelligence personnel from neighboring Air Force installations, NORAD, law enforcement agencies, 113th M.I. Region IV, and even two Navy intelligence officials from somewhere on the West Coast. The preparation included a special assignment crew with the mission to monitor the activities of the other intelligence personnel and, in particular, the personnel of the 113th M.I. To make a long story short, 119 demonstrators participated in the protest. Of the 119 individuals at the B Street Gate to Fort Carson, almost one-half (53) were intelligence gathering personnel or representatives of the press. Attempts to tape the speeches of well-known activists produced 45 minutes of the best sound effects of helicopters—at least six were airborne. The commander of the 113th M.I. walked into the G2 Operations Command Post just in time to hear one of the special assignment crew caution the headquarters that he was headed that way.

The following story may add another light touch to this testimony, but it further substantiates my conclusion that individual

commanders forced the active role of military intelligence: Tom Hayden, founder of SDS and a new left activist, made a comment in a speech in Chicago, I believe September 1969, that 400 escapees from the Fort Carson stockade were battling infantry troops from the 5th Infantry Division in the Pike National Forest in the vicinity of Pike's Peak. The only reason the Army did not use napalm against the escapees, according to Hayden, was that the battle was too close to tourist areas. The Commanding General was made aware of Hayden's statement—probably through the media—and immediately called the G2's office and wanted to know who the 400 escapees were!!!

The activities of the G2 Operations staff shifted with greater emphasis on civil disturbance target areas, rather than the obsession with Colorado activists. However, during the Fall, 1969, the Counter-Intelligence Section of the 5th M.I. remained interested in local, off-post issues. There was great interest in rumors that efforts were being made to establish an anti-war coffee house in Colorado Springs. Also, during the Fall, an "underground" newspaper, *aboveground*, appeared on the fort and throughout the local community. Counter-Intelligence operations were particularly interested in military personnel participating in these reportedly "anti-military" programs, but concern was also expressed about civilians involved.

It was reported that a bar which had recently come under new management was the rumored coffee house. Counter-intelligence agents were directed to check it. I was in the area that evening and stopped out of curiosity. There sat six counter-intelligence agents, the owner and myself in this dingily lighted dive making small talk but attempting not to let on that you knew who the guy next to you really was and what he was doing there.

Eventually, a coffee house did get established in Colorado Springs. Once established, the coffee house became a center of interest for the counter-intelligence personnel. The interest continued until after I left the fort. Rather than attracting numerous dissident soldiers, I might add, the coffee house became a home for many high-school aged activists. The appeal of the coffee house was undermined less from the constant surveillance than from an on-post experiment by a Chaplain who used part of one of the service clubs as a controlled "coffee house."

The massive nationwide Moratorium Day activities caused a flurry of activity for the staff of G2. The G2 Operations personnel worked overtime to monitor the thousands of teletype reports documenting all aspects of the nationwide anti-war observances. Locally, the counter-intelligence personnel monitored events in Colorado Springs, to include a rally at Acadias Park and an indoor program at Shrove Chapel on the campus of Colorado College. I attended the evening program at Shrove Chapel as an observer not as a member of military intelligence. However, the counter-intelligence personnel were there on assignment. They monitored speakers, relaying information back to Fort Carson via the mobile unit's Citizens' Band radio. Emphasis was placed on interpretation of speeches, especially if anti-draft policies were advocated. Attending servicemen were identified for further questioning on their motives for being at the anti-war rally. One of the counter-intelligence agents had his camera equipment in an attempt to take pictures. His efforts were prevented by an energetic cameraman from the local college newspaper who almost blew the agent's cover in a snapshot which appeared in the paper's next edition. The picture missed the agent's face—he was hiding behind me and another member of the G2 Operations staff—but the caption properly identified him as falsely using an identification card from another university. I was debriefed the next morning by

counter-intelligence personnel to ascertain if I had additional information to that which they had collected.

The intelligence gathering effort lost momentum during the last six months of my military duty. Counter-intelligence personnel with whom I maintained close ties were coming east for additional intelligence courses and the direction of counter-intelligence operations was turned to on-post problems. The G2 Operations duties underwent a reorganization tailored to target cities for civil disturbances rather than a macrocosmic view of activism. Combat intelligence training, a normal function of an Order of Battle Section of Military Intelligence, was stressed. The arriving G2 had doubts about the need for wide-ranging, large-scale intelligence operations, and many of the personnel were new replacements who did not care for office work or veterans counting the days until discharge from active duty.

Attempts were made to have the men circumvent the January 1970 order to dispose of unnecessary and untimely intelligence on civilian activities. One Captain, the ambitious officer whom I have described above, instructed the analyst to copy the information from spot reports verbatim and place it in the work-books thus, the requirement that spot reports be destroyed within 90 days would be followed, but the information would still be available. This suggestion was ignored more out of slack leadership than out of concern for violation of regulations. As for myself, I inherited the Boy Scout troop for dependents operated on the post—I had been an assistant scoutmaster—and devoted most of my full-time efforts to keeping the troop running with little concern for the intelligence operation.

In preparing this testimony, I have attempted to highlight many of the activities of a divisional level military intelligence unit. Several candid observations can be drawn:

First, the system was very inefficient. The carelessness and haphazard manner of gathering intelligence should arouse grave concern. The characterization of military intelligence as a "keystone cop" operation would be acceptable if it were not for the fact that the information gathered, stored and utilized violated individual privacy and it was undertaken in complete seriousness. The agent recording information might have been hopelessly inept at his job, but the material he gathered whether reliable or not, was forwarded to higher command. The information sent to Fort Holabird might have been totally erroneous, but it was transmitted to units with a civil disturbance mission and placed into the computer system as substantiated facts. As I mentioned, the units with a civil disturbance mission would rely on the teletype reports, along with Oplans and intelligence estimates based on computer material, to develop procedures to quell disturbances within given target communities. Thus, the careless gathering of intelligence seriously threatened the performance of troops in actual civil disturbance operations.

Second, the carefree, covert intelligence operations encroached on the rights of many Americans. No recourse or right of challenge was available to the individuals upon whom reports were gathered. Erroneous reports were not only misleading for military commanders, but they were a serious threat to many civilians. There is no assurance that any of us may not have been falsely identified and therefore suspected of disloyal activities. One cannot laugh-off as "keystone cop" an intelligence gathering system upon which actual "combat" missions relied and which encroached on our Constitutional rights.

Third, the individuals who directed the intelligence gathering operation and those who had the need for the intelligence were most instrumental in determining the extent of intrusion on civil liberties. As noted, local

commanders over-reacted to having insufficient information to perform their domestic responsibilities. Volume instead of quality reportedly impressed officers in command and thus, the intrusion on civil liberties prospered. The need for quantity increased the number of reports containing erroneous information. The need for quantity sparked mistrust and jurisdictional squabbles between units engaged in the intelligence operation. I even venture to say, that the need for quantity instead of quality—more than any other single factor—gave the system its particular character.

In closing, I want to reiterate that I come before this committee today not to cast stones at the military, but instead, to shed light on an intelligence gathering operation which expanded beyond its needs and its controls. As the encroachment upon the domestic sector soared, the intelligence network was flooded with useless information. Erroneous information forced additional intrusion of civilian privacy as military units preferred to develop their own intelligence rather than rely upon the developed information of other commands. Thus, a vicious cycle ensued. Attempts to limit the intelligence system led to jurisdictional squabbles similar to the one I have described between the 5th M.I. and the 118th M.I. Region IV headquarters. Controls were poorly enforced and thus, they were often ignored.

Hopefully, the public disclosure of the intelligence gathering operation will break the cycle of intrusion. These hearings will point out to the military the folly of maintaining a domestic intelligence operation using untrained personnel, unsubstantiated information and ill-suited regulations to assist in civil disturbance missions. Furthermore, I am hopeful that these hearings will point out to all Americans the serious dangers of compromising our Constitutional rights in the name of false security. Covert intelligence operations, military or civilian, must cease if the Constitution is to be upheld. Individuals must have the right to challenge information collected by government agencies to insure that we are innocent until proven guilty; instead of suspect until proven otherwise.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FORMER SENATOR TAFT SPEAKS ON FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point an address delivered by the former Senator from Ohio Mr. Taft in the Senate on January 5, 1951.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM OF FOREIGN POLICY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE SAFETY OF THE NATION

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may address the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. If there are no further requests for insertions in the RECORD or for submission of other routine matters, the Senator from Ohio is recognized.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I wish to thank the majority leader for his action in opening the floor of the Senate for debate before the President's State of the Union's message. In view of the crisis in which we find ourselves today, the President may well take longer for the preparation of his message, but certainly that should not prevent discussion of vital national issues on the floor of the Senate.

During recent years a theory has developed that there shall be no criticism of the foreign policy of the administration, that any such criticism is an attack on the unity of the Nation, that it gives aid and comfort to the enemy, and that it sabotages

any idea of a bipartisan foreign policy for the national benefit. I venture to state that this proposition is a fallacy and a very dangerous fallacy threatening the very existence of the Nation.

In very recent days we have heard appeals for unity from the administration and from its supporters. I suggest that these appeals are an attempt to cover up the past faults and failures of the administration and enable it to maintain the secrecy which has largely enveloped our foreign policy since the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt. It was a distinguished Democrat, President Woodrow Wilson, who denounced secret diplomacy and demanded open covenant openly arrived at. The administrations of President Roosevelt and President Truman have repudiated that wise democratic doctrine and assumed complete authority to make in secret the most vital decisions and commit this country to the most important and dangerous obligations. As I see it, Members of Congress, and particularly Members of the Senate, have a constitutional obligation to reexamine constantly and discuss the foreign policy of the United States. If we permit appeals to unity to bring an end to that criticism, we endanger not only the constitutional liberties of the country, but even its future existence.

I may say that I hope the debate will occur on the floor of the Senate. I was invited to speak over the radio tonight following the speeches by former President Hoover and Mr. Dulles, and I declined because I felt that a statement of foreign policy by a Senator ought to be made on the floor of the Senate. I think there ought to be a continuous discussion of that policy during this session of the Senate.

Certainly when policies have been determined, unity in execution is highly desirable, and in the preparation for and the conduct of war it is essential. During recent months, the Republican minority has joined in granting to the President those powers which may be necessary to deal with the situation. We have not hesitated to pass a draft law, a law granting extensive powers of economic control, and almost unlimited appropriations for the Armed Forces. No action of the minority can be pointed to as in any way blocking or delaying the mobilization of our resources and our Armed Forces. If there has been any delay in the rearming, it has been in the administrative branch of the Government.

But it is part of our American system that basic elements of foreign policy shall be openly debated. It is said that such debate and the differences that may occur give aid and comfort to our possible enemies. I think that the value of such aid and comfort is grossly exaggerated. The only thing that can give real aid and comfort to the enemy is the adoption of a policy which plays into their hands as has our policy in the Far East. Such aid and comfort can only be prevented by frank criticism before such a policy is adopted.

Whatever the value of unity, it is also true that unity carried to unreasonable extremes can destroy a country. The Kaiser achieved unity in Germany. Hitler again achieved the same unity at the cost of freedom many years later. Mussolini achieved unity in Italy. The leaders of Japan through a method of so-called thought control achieved unity in Japan. In every case, policies adopted by these enforcers of unity led to the destruction of their own country. We have regarded ourselves as safe and a probable victor in every war. Today it is just as easy for us to adopt a false foreign policy leading to the destruction of our people as for any other nation to do so. The best safeguard against fatal error lies in continuous criticism and discussion to bring out the truth and develop the best program.

I have referred to the general tendency